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Abstract
This master thesis seeks to evaluate the social economic wellbeing
of single parent households across eleven European countries. Starting
with market income, taxes and transfers are incorporated to arrive at a
disposable income figure. Effort is further made to include the value of in
kind transfers, more specifically education and health care services. This
results in an extended income concept, where redistribution both in cash
and in kind is accounted for.
Income figures for market income and disposable income are retrieved
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The data is based on national
surveys from 2004/2005, and include on average 593 single parent house-
holds per country. Data on education expenditures are taken from the
Euro stat database and include primary and secondary education. In line
with previous literature on public services, tertiary education is excluded
from the analysis. Data on health care expenditures are found in the
OECD Health database, and include all public expenses related to health
care. Health care income is allocated to the households based on the so
called insurance principle, in which expected health care usage is depen-
dent on age and sex. All income figures, both in cash an in kind, are
adjusted according to the square root equivalence scale.
Borrowing from an extensive literature on welfare state typology, the
eleven sample countries are classified into five different welfare regimes;
Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian, Southern and Post-communist.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that single parents gain more in welfare
regimes with universal, rather than targeted, social benefits, implying that
the level of redistribution should be particularly high in the Scandinavian
countries. The underlying reasoning is that popular support for public
redistribution is higher with universal coverage, thereby resulting in more
generous social services. This is in line with the findings of Moene and
Wallerstein (2001), Brady and Burroway (2012), Mitchell et al (1994) and
Korpi and Palme (1998).
Single parents are found to obtain an equalized market income only
60% as high as other parents. This figure increases to 72% once the tax-
transfer system is accounted for, implying an increase in relative income
of around 20%. Adding education and health care benefits to the analysis
further increases relative single parent income by 10%, resulting in a total
equalized income 79% as high as other parents. Cash redistribution is
thus found to account for two thirds of the redistributive effect, while the
remaining impact is caused by in kind income. Including more publicly
provided goods in the analysis should increase the relative importance of in
kind redistribution further. Total redistribution is found to be high in the
Nordic countries, at above 50%. In accordance with the hypothesis, it thus
seems as though single parents are important beneficiaries of universal
welfare regimes, even though these do not specifically target low income
households. The results further suggest that type of welfare regime is
an important indicator in assessing the re-distributional gain directed at
single parent households.
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1 Introduction
This master thesis seeks to evaluate the social economic wellbeing of single
parent households across eleven European countries. Starting with market in-
come, taxes and transfers are incorporated to arrive at disposable income. Effort
is further made to include the value of public services in order to establish an
extended income concept. It is thus possible to address the level of redistribu-
tion achieved in a given country – both in cash and in kind. Precisely because
single parent households are one of the household types that consistently per-
form below average economically, their relative outcomes are of great interest
in assessing the degree to which social welfare systems succeed in ensuring the
economic wellbeing of vulnerable groups.
Borrowing from an extensive literature on welfare state typology, the eleven
sample countries are classified into five different welfare regimes; Scandinavian,
Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian, Southern and Post-communist. The hypothesis of
this thesis is that single parents gain more in welfare regimes with universal,
rather than targeted, social benefits, implying that the level of redistribution
should be particularly high in the Scandinavian countries. The underlying rea-
soning is that popular support for public redistribution is higher with universal
coverage, thereby resulting in more generous social services. This is in line with
the findings of Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Brady and Burroway (2012),
Mitchell et al (1994) and Korpi and Palme (1998).
Consider the stylized example of a targeted and a universal welfare system in
a context of majority voting among non-altruistic voters. The targeted system
relies on a tax t to finance benefits b, directed at single parents only. This is
captured by equation (1), where n stands for number of individuals, w stands
for wage, SP stands for single parents, MC stands for the middle class, and R
stands for the rich. In the universal welfare regime a tax T is levied to finance
benefits B, directed at all types of individuals, as illustrated in equation (2).
t(nSPwSP + nMCwMC + nMCwMC) = b nSP (1)
T (nSPwSP + nMCwMC + nMCwMC) = B(nSP + nMC + nR) (2)
1
nSP
nSP + nMC + nR
< 1/2 (3)
nSP + nMC
nSP + nMC + nR
> 1/2 (4)
Assuming that neither single parents nor the rich make up the majority of the
population, so that (3) and (4) holds, some simplistic, but interesting conclusions
emerge. With a targeted welfare system it will not be possible to sustain a level
of positive redistribution by majority voting, so that t = 0. This is due to
the fact that only single parents benefit from the system, making it politically
attractive to cut taxes and decrease spending. With a universal system on
the other hand, all individuals receive some gains. Because contributions are
paid in proportion with income, while benefits are shared equally, it is assumed
that single parents and the middle class are net beneficiaries in a universal
welfare scheme. As a result, it will be possible to obtain a positive amount
of redistribution, so that T > 0. The assumption that single parents and the
middle class benefit from the universal welfare regime is similar to the condition
found in Moene and Wallerstein (2000, p.11) that the median of the earnings
distribution is less than (or equal to) the mean.
This simple example illustrates the case for relying on universal, rather than
targeted, benefits, in order to help vulnerable groups. While the assumption of
purely self-interested voters is clearly too strict, the positive correlation between
universal benefits and welfare state generosity is supported by empirical findings
(see for example Mitchell et al. 1994 and Brady and Burroway 2012).
Income figures for market income and disposable income are retrieved from
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The data is based on national surveys from
2004/2005, and include on average 593 single parent households per country.
Data on education expenditures are taken from the Euro stat database and
include primary and secondary education. In line with previous literature on
public goods, tertiary education is excluded from the analysis. Data on health
care expenditures are found in the OECD Health database, and include all
public expenses related to health care. Health care income is allocated to the
households based on the so called insurance principle, in which expected health
care usage is dependent on age and sex. All income figures, both in cash an in
kind, are adjusted according to the square root equivalence scale.
Single parents are found to obtain an equalized market income 60% as high
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as other parents. This figure increases to 72% once the tax-transfer system is
accounted for, implying an increase in relative income of around 20%. Adding
education and health care benefits to the analysis further increases relative
single parent income with 10%, resulting in a total income 79% as high as
other parents. Cash redistribution is thus found to account for two thirds of
the re-distributional effect, while the remaining impact is caused by in kind
transfers. Including more publicly provided goods in the analysis should increase
the relative importance of in kind income further.
The low standard of living among single parent households is by itself enough
to merit an interest in their relative economic wellbeing across countries and
welfare regimes. However, single parent families are of especial interest due to
their steadily increasing size. Single parent households have come to account for
almost 10% of all households, and are expected to increase further in magnitude
during the coming years (OECD 2008 p.29). Combining this with their low
standard of living should make them one of the most interesting household
groups seen from a policy perspective.
Total redistribution is found to be high in the Nordic countries, at above
50%. In accordance with the hypothesis, it thus seems as though single parents
are important beneficiaries of universal welfare regimes, even though these do
not specifically target low income households. The results further suggest that
type of welfare regime is an important indicator in assessing the re-distributional
gain directed at single parent households.
The following section elaborates on the economic situation of single parent
households in Europe. Section 3 introduces the five welfare regimes, and pro-
vides a brief introduction to some previous findings. Education and health care
services are discussed in section 4, before a description of the technique used
to assign in kind income is offered in section 5. The calculations for cash in-
come are outlined in section 6, followed by the calculations for in kind income
in section 7. Finally, a discussion of the results is offered in section 8.
2 Single parent families in Europe
The demographic changes taking place in Western countries are not limited
to declining fertility rates and aging populations. The structure of the typical
household unit is also changing. According to the OECD (2008, ch.2) families
are shrinking in size, and an increasing share of the adult population is now
living alone.
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Table 1 illustrates the number of single parent households as a share of all
household types. Single parent families make up on average 9% of all households,
varying from 5% in Switzerland to 13% in Poland. Considering single parent
households as a share of all households with children would obviously produce
larger figures. Although the share of male single parents has increased in recent
years, the magnitude is still relatively limited. Women make up on average
84% of all single parents, and account for less than 80% only in Luxembourg.
Considering the two variables simultaneously reveals a weak positive correlation,
suggesting that women account for a larger share of single parents in countries
where single parenting is more common.
OECD projections from 2011 indicate that the prevalence of single parent
households will increase over the next 20 years. For those countries with projec-
tions available, the largest expected increases are found in the United Kingdom
and Norway, where single parent households are expected to increase with 22
and 27% respectively1.
Table 1: Share of single parent households.
Country Single parent households Share of which are single mothers
Switzerland 5.2 85.1
Sweden 7.0 85.0
Finland 7.6 84.9
Luxembourg 8.4 77.7
Norway 8.6 82.0
Italy 8.9 82.5
Austria 9.7 85.3
United Kingdom 9.8 86.7
Spain 9.9 81.1
Hungary 10.7 87.4
Poland 12.6 87.9
Single parent households as a share of all households (%), and share of which
are single mothers (%), year 2000. Data: OECD.
2.1 Single parent economic outcomes
Single parent households face higher poverty risks for several reasons. Living
without a partner means not being able to access the economic gains connected
1Projections are available for Switzerland (8% increase), Austria (10% increase), United
Kingdom (22% increase), Norway (27% increase), and other European countries not in the
sample (OECD 2011, p.29).
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to cohabitation, which are believed to be substantial (see for example Sørensen
1994). Couples living together should be able to save expenses on budget posts
such as fuel, rent, heating etc., thereby giving them an economic advantage
compared to those living alone. By pooling their resources they also succeed
in mitigating the economic risks of (unplanned) unemployment (OECD 2008,
p.59). Second, single parent families have an unfavorable demographic profile,
as the child-to-adult ratio is high. The average single parent family has more
children than adults, thereby increasing the need for a high income of the only
potential earner in the household. An additional reason why poverty risks are
high among single parents is the gender composition of the household heads.
As women earn less than men in all sample countries, the high share of single
mothers is found to substantially reduce the expected income of single parent
households (see for example Nielsen 2004).
Other personal characteristics of the single parent besides gender may also
help in explaining their elevated poverty risks. Rector and Kim (2007), Norton
and Glick (1986) and Western et al. (2008) find that single mothers in the
United States are younger and less educated than other mothers, characteristics
which correlate with lower income levels. The socioeconomic background of
single parents, as well as the average number of children, may be other relevant
factors. Wong et al (1993) find that American single mothers are younger than
single mothers in other Western countries, and also have more children. The
authors thus argue that the personal characteristics of single mothers are less
favorable in the United States than in Europe.
An important factor in addressing the economic welfare of single parent
households is labor market participation. Data from LIS indicate that on av-
erage 56% of two parent families have two earners in the household, and only
4% of these families report having no earners in the household. In Norway and
Sweden both parents are employed in more than 60% of the cases, while al-
most no two parent households are without any earners. As could be expected
the picture changes dramatically when considering single parent families. This
household group has less flexibility with regards to child care and work, and
may face more limited opportunities in the labor market. This could be the
result of the personal characteristics of the household head, such as education
and experience, or may be related to a higher need for flexible work hours, less
opportunities to work nights/weekends etc. On average, 20% of single parent
families report having no earners in the household. The figure is especially high
for Poland and the United Kingdom, where respectively 36 and 46% of single
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parent families have no earners in the household. In no sample country is the
figure below 10%.
LIS also provides data on the employment status of the household head.
Turning from number of earners to employment status yields a similar impres-
sion. Unemployment rates by household type are illustrated in figure 1, and
highlight the large cross country variations. While only 12% of single parents
are unemployed in Norway, the figure for the United Kingdom exceeds 50%.
The United Kingdom, Switzerland and Poland are the three countries in which
single parent unemployment is the highest, but two parent unemployment is
found to be modest in all three cases. Similarly, Italy and Austria have the
two highest unemployment rates for two parent families, but report low relative
unemployment rates for single parent households. It is thus clear that the cor-
relation between single parent unemployment and two parent unemployment is
relatively weak. These findings indicate that the employment status of single
parent households is affected not only be macroeconomic conditions, but also
rely on country specific factors such as culture, norms, institutions etc.
Figure 1: Unemployment rates by household type







	

	
Unemployment rates for single parent households (SP) and two parent house-
holds (TP) (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
In explaining the low economic outcomes of single parent households both
structural and individual causes must be considered. Lack of adequate child care
services and a rigid labor market will make it harder for single parents to cope
economically, but may prove manageable challenges for the well educated, high-
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earning single parent. An extensive welfare state with generous social services
will likewise make the personal characteristics of the single parent less crucial
in avoiding long-lasting poverty spells.
Table 2 illustrates the poverty rates for children residing in single parent and
two parent households by the work status of the parent(s). A child residing in a
two parent household where both parents are employed faces an average poverty
risk of 3% across the sample. The figure varies from 0-1% in Norway, the United
Kingdom, Finland and Sweden, to 5-6% in Luxembourg and Poland. If however,
the child lives with an unemployed single parent, the poverty risk skyrockets to
an average of 54%, exceeding 70% in Poland, Spain and Italy. As is easily
seen from the table, the employment status of the single parent is important in
deciding the poverty risk. In going from unemployed to employed the poverty
risk of children living in single parent households falls with 36 percentage-points,
from 54% to 18%.
The OECD (2008, p.70) finds that youths and single parents have lost ground
economically in most Western countries. The winners are those at the end
of their working life and elderly people, who have experienced a substantial
decline in poverty rates over the past decades. Combining this with the fact that
single parent households are becoming increasingly more common, suggests that
ensuring their economic wellbeing should be a high priority in shaping social
policy in the future.
Table 2: Child poverty risk by household type
SP TP
Country Not working Working One working Both working
Switzerland 22 - - -
Hungary 31 21 6 3
United Kingdom 39 7 9 1
Norway 42 6 7 0
Finland 46 6 9 1
Austria 51 11 4 3
Sweden 55 11 18 1
Luxembourg 69 38 16 5
Poland 75 26 28 6
Spain 78 32 23 5
Italy 88 23 23 3
Average 54 18 14 3
Poverty risk for children in single parent households (SP) and two parent house-
holds (TP) by work status (%), year 2008. Data: OECD.
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3 Welfare state regimes
In 1990 Esping-Andersen published his Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,
thereby sparking a long lasting debate on welfare state typology. In the original
version only three welfare state categories were included – liberal, corporatist
and social democratic. The classification technique has been discussed and
elaborated on in a now substantial academic literature, resulting in a number
of different, but similar, proposed categories. This thesis relies mainly on the
classification system of Ferrera (1996)2, but also draws on the efforts of Fenger
(2007) to include the Eastern European countries in the welfare regime typology.
The result is summarized in table 3. The United Kingdom is described as the
only Anglo-Saxon or liberal country in the sample, while the Bismarckian or
corporatist regimes include Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland. Sweden,
Norway and Finland make up the Scandinavian or social democratic group,
while Italy and Spain are the only two Southern countries in the sample. In line
with Fenger (2007), Poland and Hungary are named Post-communist European
type regimes, and accordingly grouped together.
Table 3: Welfare state regimes
Anglo-Saxon Bismarckian Scandinavian Southern Post-communist
United Kingdom Luxembourg Sweden Italy Poland
Austria Norway Spain Hungary
Switzerland Finland
Welfare state regimes (Arts and Gelissen 2002, Ferrara 1996, Fenger 2007)
The Anglo-Saxon countries, in this case only Britain, are characterized by
fairly high welfare state coverage, in which social assistance is often found to be
means tested or targeted. At the other end of the scale one finds the Scandina-
vian countries, where universal coverage appears to be the norm. In addition
to their universal welfare coverage, the social democratic countries are further
characterized by generous social benefits (Arts and Gelissen 2002, p.177). The
Bismarckian and the southern countries are not as easy to categorize with re-
spect to targeting and universalism. The Bismarckian countries do however
have more generous welfare arrangements, while the southern countries fall be-
hind in the level of minimum social assistance in particular (Arts and Gelissen
2002). It is therefore hypothesized that single parents will benefit more from the
Bismarckian welfare regimes than the Southern ones. Poland and Hungary fall
2As presented in Arts and Gelissen (2002, p.43-44).
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into the category of Post-communist European type welfare regimes, as named
by Fenger (2007, p.24-25). According to the author these countries resemble the
Bismarckian countries, but are characterized by lower levels of social economic
well-being. However, the group performs better than the so called former-USSR
type of countries, a group consisting of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rus-
sia and Ukraine (none of which are included in the sample). This is made visible
in the higher levels of economic growth, inflation and egalitarianism found in
the European type countries (Fenger 2007, p.25). Because of the relatively low
level of social spending found in these countries it is expected that single parents
will gain less than in other regimes.
There exists a substantial literature on the efficiency and success of targeted
versus universal welfare benefits. The advocates of means testing argue it is
more efficient in reaching the poor, while at the same time adhering to the
public budget constraint (Smolensky et al. 1995). In other words, for a given
sum of public expenditure, means tested transfers would have a larger impact on
those most in need. However, proponents of universal welfare regimes argue that
the size of the redistributive budget is not fixed, but is in fact endogenous to the
regime chosen. In a system where public transfers adhere to a politically weak
group, popular support for the re-distributional scheme will be less, thereby
making it easier for governments to cut social spending over time. This can
lead to the so called paradox of redistribution, in which increased targeting of
the poor results in less poverty reduction (Korpi and Palme 1998). Moene and
Wallerstein (2001) explore this proposition in a political economy model, and
conclude that the only way to ensure popular support for welfare benefits with
self-interested voters is to target the benefits sufficiently broadly. In a paper on
targeting and universalism Brady and Burroway (2012) look at single mother
poverty, and conclude that universal social policy is more efficient in reducing
poverty among single mothers.
Based on the empirical and theoretical findings of Moene and Wallerstein
(2001), Brady and Burroway (2012), Mitchell et al. (1994) and Korpi and Palme
(1998) the hypothesis of this thesis is that single parents will benefit more from a
universal then a targeted welfare regime. Even though single parents often have
low income, and thereby should be among the main beneficiaries of targeted
welfare benefits, this effect is thought to be outweighed by the higher levels of
welfare generosity found in more universal regimes.
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4 Public provision of private goods
The government redistributes economic resources not only through the tax-
transfer system, but also through the provision of goods and services. The public
economics literature provides sound arguments for the provision of public goods,
as these tend to be underprovided in a private market solution. Although there
are few good examples of pure public goods there are many interesting cases
of mixed public goods. These include police, defense, roads etc. Such goods
tend to be universally provided, as restriction is often difficult or unwanted.
The provision of public goods does have re-distributional effects, and should
optimally be included in the analysis. However, as this would require vast
amounts of data no such attempt is made.
The literature is less clear on the case for public provision of private goods, as
conventional economic theory suggests that the provision of such goods should
be left to the market. According to Christiansen (2002, p.150) private goods
that face public provision have at least three factors in common. First, they are
services, and thus difficult to resell. Second, they have a particular and direct
impact on human resources, and thus an important effect on people’s ability
to function in society. Finally, the production of these goods is typically labor
intensive. As a result, most publicly provided private goods come under the
labels “health”, “education” and “care” (Christiansen 2002, p.150). Accordingly,
this paper will focus on education and health care services.
4.1 Education services
According to Christiansen (2002, p.158) the main argument for public provision
of education services is that credit markets are an inadequate source of funding
for these expenditures. As future earnings cannot be pledged as collateral,
access to education in a private market solution would be granted not to the
most promising, but to those with sufficiently aﬄuent parents.
Single parent households are expected to benefit especially from education
services because of the relatively high number of children per adult. Also, be-
cause single parent families have income levels below average, access to educa-
tion may be dependent on public provision. Any differences in the subjective
valuation across households will however not be captured in the analysis.
Public provision of education services is found throughout Europe and make
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up an important share of the public budget. On average, 6% of GDP is used on
public education services, implying that education stands for about 12% of total
public expenditures. As Table 4 illustrates, the figures vary across the sample
countries, with education services standing for 9-17% of all public expenses.
Table 4: Public education expenditures
Country Education exp. (% GDP) Education exp. (% total exp.)
Italy 5 9
Austria 5 11
Hungary 6 11
Spain 5 11
Luxembourg 5 12
Finland 6 12
Sweden 7 13
Norway 6 13
Poland 6 13
United Kingdom 6 14
Switzerland 6 17
Public education expenditures as a share of GDP (%) and as a share of total
public expences (%), avg. year 2005-2009. Data: SILC.
4.2 Health care services
Health care services are according to Christiansen (2002, p.156) the most im-
portant publicly provided good. It’s funding is based on an insurance principle,
in which inclusion is universal. This ensures that the adverse selection prob-
lem of insurance is minimized, thus providing a convincing argument for public
provision.
Health care expenditures stand for on average 6% of GDP, ranging from
2% in Switzerland to 8% in Norway and the United Kingdom. This implies
that health care services account for on average 14% of all public expenditures.
Public spending on health care exceeds 15% of total spending in about half the
sample, and accounts for less than 10% only in Switzerland.
Although access to health care services is probably of great importance to
single parent households, it is not expected that these services should provide
any particular economic benefit to single parent families within the current
framework. The reason for this is the low average age of single parent house-
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holds, which is linked to health care needs below average. Only after turning 60
do health care usage rates exceed the average value. Any difference in health
care needs between single parent families and other families, besides those cap-
tured by age or gender, are not accounted for in the analysis.
Table 5: Public health care expenditures
Country Health exp. (% GDP) Health exp. (% total exp.)
Switzerland 2 6
Hungary 5 10
Poland 5 12
Luxembourg 5 13
Sweden 7 14
Italy 8 16
Finland 8 16
Austria 8 17
Spain 7 17
United Kingdom 8 18
Norway 8 18
Public health care expenditures as a share of GDP (%) and as a share of total
public expences (%), avg. year 2005-2009. Data: SILC.
5 Assignment technique for in kind income
5.1 Valuation of public services
Public transfers which come in kind rather than in cash restrict the choice set of
the receiver. It therefore seems plausible that such income should have a lower
value than its cash equivalent. This effect may differ across households, as es-
pecially low income families may have preferred to spend the in kind transfer
in other ways (Smeeding et al. 1993, p.237). However, one could also make
the case that public services are of particular high value to low income house-
holds, as these services might otherwise have been inaccessible. An example is
higher education, which might have been unobtainable for certain groups with-
out public provision. Observing what individuals would spend on such services
in a private market or undertaking surveys on willingness to pay would give an
indication of the actual valuation (Aaberge et al. 2010b, p.332).
This paper follows the literature in assuming that the value of public services
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equals the cost of production. See for example Smeeding et al. (1993), Paulus et
al (2009), Garfinkel et al. (2006) and Aaberge et al. (2010a,b). While this may
lead to an overstatement of the benefits received, it is not given that it should
bias the cross country comparisons. Also, as society is directing a certain amount
of public expenditures at services such as education and health care, this may
reflect the value placed on these goods by society. A paternalistic approach
would then indicate that even if households would spend less on education and
health care in a private market, the actual benefit is equal to the level society
sees fit.
Another concern connected to valuation at cost of production is variations
in price (Aaberge et al. 2006, p.62, 2010a, p.19). If some countries face higher
unit costs of production this will lead to an overstatement of the value of these
services. For example, Anderson et al. (2006) argue that the reason why US
health expenditures are much higher than the European average is due to price
differences. As it appears likely that costs may differ across countries this caveat
should be kept in mind.
It is further assumed that only the household receiving the public transfer
benefits, thereby ignoring any external effects. As the public services considered
are likely to have an impact on the aggregate level of human capital in the
country there may very well be positive externalities connected to these services,
but they will not be included in the analysis. Further, it is assumed that a
transfer directed at a specific household member benefits the household as a
common unit.
5.2 Allocation of public services
Education expenditures are assumed to benefit all households with children in
the relevant age group, thereby implying a take up rate of 100%. A possible
concern is the relative importance of private education services, but this is,
according to Aaberge et al. (2010b, p.333), modest. Tertiary education is
excluded from the analysis, in line with most literature on the subject. See
for example Smeeding et al. (1993), Garfinkel et al. (2006) an Aaberge et al.
(2010a,b).
To allocate the education transfers, per student expenditure levels are cal-
culated based on Euro stat data. The average household then receives the per
student transfer times the expected number of children in the relevant age group
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residing in the household.
The allocation of health care services differs from education services, in be-
ing independent of actual usage. In stead, the so called insurance principle is
followed. This is in line with previous papers such as Aaberge et al. (2010),
Smeeding et al. (1993) and Paulus et al. (2010). In a private market people
will pay different premiums on their health insurance based on certain demo-
graphic characteristics. The expected health care usage is thus what is assumed
to matter for the benefit received. Accordingly, health care transfers will be
allocated based on the demographic profile of the average household, in which
data on health care usage by age and sex is provided by the European com-
mission (2012). The average household thus receives an in kind health income
equal to the health care expenditure per person multiplied with the expected
usage of the different household members.
5.3 Equivalence scales
Households differ in size and composition, which leads to differences in needs. A
family of two needs more income than a family of one to obtain the same stan-
dard of living, but probably not twice the amount. This is due to economics of
scale connected to cohabitation. It seems plausible that the two-person house-
hold will be able to spend less per person on expenditure posts such as housing,
heating, transport etc., than the single person household. It is therefore neces-
sary to correct for household size when undertaking household comparisons.
While the concept of equivalence scales is intuitively appealing, the actual
calculation is somewhat arbitrary. Most scales control for both size and age
composition by assigning different weights to different people, while other scales
account only for the total household size. There seems to be little agreement in
the literature on which scale that best captures household needs. Smeeding et
al. (1993) assign a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, a weight of 0.4 to the second
adult, and a weight of 0.3 to each child. Garfinkel et al. (2004) account only
for total size and divide by the square root of the household size. The Euro
stat database makes use of the modified OECD scale, which assigns a weight of
1.0 to the first person above 14, a weight of 0.5 to the second person above 14,
and a weight of 0.3 to children aged 14 or below. Several studies indicate that
the choice of equivalence scale may have an impact on poverty and inequality
measures, highlighting the need for a common framework (Buhmann et al. 1988,
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de Vos and Zaidi 1997).
Adding in kind transfers to the picture complicates the analysis further, as
it is not obvious that cash and non-cash income should be equalized according
to the same principles. Smeeding et al. (1993) suggest not equalizing in kind
income at all, as they argue that there are no economics of scale in non-cash
income. Garfinkel et al. (2004) utilize the same equivalence scale for cash and
non-cash income, and divide all income by the square root of the household size.
An alternative approach is put forward in Aaberge et al. (2010a) as an attempt
to control for differences in needs across households. The authors develop a
theoretical framework to identify the minimum needs of different target groups,
and estimate these needs with the use of Norwegian municipality data. This
allows the authors to create a need based equivalence scale, where different
household types need different amounts of public services in order to reach the
same standard of living. For example, elderly people tend to need more health
care benefits, and families with children need more education benefits. Aaberge
et al. (2010a,b) argue that not allowing for differences in needs may lead to the
incomes of groups with high needs for public services being overestimated.
This paper’s focus is exclusively on single parent families. It is assumed that
their needs are identical across countries once the average number of children is
accounted for. Two parent households are used as a reference group, but no at-
tempt is made to compare single parent income to two parent income. Instead,
single parent income relative to two parent income is compared across coun-
tries. As long as the assumption is made that the differences in need between
single parent and two parent households are the same for all countries, needs
adjustment as outlined by Aaberge et al. (2010a,b) should not be needed.
The household income figures used in this paper are taken from the Luxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS), and are already equalized according to the square
root scale. To ensure consistency both cash and non cash income will be equal-
ized according to this scale.
6 Cash income calculations
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provides data on disposable income and
market income for different household types. Market income is defined as total
income, before taxes and transfers. The difference between market and dispos-
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able income is thus the result of the tax-transfer system, reflecting the degree
of cash redistribution in a given country.
The two income measures are provided for single parent and two parent
households, by the gender of the household head. To arrive at the total in-
come figures the gender distribution of the household heads are accounted for.
This information is retrieved from the LIS database for all countries except
Switzerland and Spain, in which OECD data are utilized. All income figures
are adjusted for household size by the square root scale.
Eleven European countries are included in the analysis. These are Austria,
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom. Country income figures are for 2004, with the
exception of Sweden and Hungary, in which figures from 2005 are utilized. All
income measures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted dol-
lars (Int$), and should therefore be comparable across the sample.
Some countries have certain gender specific data missing, in which case esti-
mates are used to fill in the blanks. Income figures for single fathers are missing
for Switzerland, Hungary and Italy. By combining single mother income with
the average gender wage gap, single father incomes are estimated. The same
procedure is used to estimate the income of two parent households headed by
women in Hungary and Norway.
6.1 Market income
As illustrated in figure 2, single parent market income is well below that of other
parents in all sample countries. While single parent income ranges from Int$
5,154 in Poland to 25,974 in Luxembourg, two parent income ranges from Int$
7,711 in Poland to 40,235 in Luxembourg. The relative country ranking is quite
similar with respect to which household type is being considered, but especially
two countries are affected. The United Kingdom moves down four places when
going from two parent income to single parent income, reflecting the relative
weak outcomes of British single parent families. Austria on the other hand,
moves up four places, indicating that Austrian single parent families perform
relatively well. Other countries move with a maximum of one place in the
relative country ranking.
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Figure 2: Market income by household type
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Market income for single parent households (SP) and two-parent households
(TP) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS.
Figure 3 illustrates single parent market income relative to the income of two
parent households. This is calculated according to formula (5). As can be seen,
single parent families earn less than 50% of two parent families in the United
Kingdom and Norway, and more than 70% of two parent families in Italy and
Hungary. On average, single parents obtain a market income 59% as high as
other parents.
Rel.SP income =
SPincome
TPincome
∗ 100 (5)
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Figure 3: Relative market income
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Single parent market income relative to two-parent market income (%), year
2004. Data: LIS.
A closer look at the market incomes of single parent households reveals sub-
stantial gender differences, as illustrated in figure 4. While single mothers on
average earn only 55% of a two-parent income, single fathers earn on average
88%, with the figure exceeding 100% in four countries. The difference is es-
pecially striking in Norway, where single fathers have over double the relative
income of single mothers.
Plotting the difference in relative outcomes of male and female single parents
against the share of single fathers in the country results in a positive relationship,
indicating that the single parent gender wage gap is larger in countries where
single fathers are more common. While this could be a result of for example
increased political power of single fathers, it may also be a result of some external
factor such as country income, which seems to be linked both to larger wage
gaps and to a higher share of male single parenting.
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Figure 4: Relative market income by gender
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Relative market income of female headed single parent households (SP-F) and
male headed single parent households (SP-M) (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
6.2 Disposable income
The disposable income of single parent households is below that of a two-parent
household in all sample countries, as illustrated in figure 5. However, the differ-
ences appear smaller in magnitude then was the case for market income. While
the average single parent household has a disposable income of Int$ 15,856, the
average two parent household has a disposable income of Int$ 22,396.
Expressing single parent disposable income relative to two-parent income
yields the estimates presented in figure 6. Single parents have relative disposable
incomes ranging from 70-80% in Luxembourg, Hungary, Switzerland, Poland,
Italy and Austria, while having incomes just below 70% in Sweden, Norway, Fin-
land and Spain. Relative single parent outcomes appear to be noticeably lower
in the United Kingdom than in the rest of the sample, with relative income just
exceeding 50%. This appears to be caused by the low relative market income of
single parent families rather than a low degree of redistribution, suggesting that
British single parents obtain noticeably low incomes in the market compared
to other British parents. Part of the explanation may lie in the remarkably
high unemployment rates observed for single parent households in the United
Kingdom.
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Figure 5: Disposable income by household type
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Disposable income for single parent households (SP) and two-parent households
(TP) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS
Figure 6: Relative disposable income
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Single parent disposable income relative to two-parent disposable income (%),
year 2004. Data: LIS
Considering relative income by gender shows that the gender gaps have de-
creased quite substantially in going from market income to disposable income.
Although the single parent gender gap is still largest in Norway, it has fallen
dramatically, from 116% to 44%. On average, single fathers have relative dis-
posable incomes that exceed single mothers with 26%. This is much lower than
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the 62% difference found when considering relative market income, suggesting
that single mothers receive particularly large gains from the tax-transfer system.
However, these gains are nowhere near eliminating the gender wage gaps.
Figure 7: Relative disposable income by gender
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Relative male single parent disposable income (SP-M) and relative female single
parent disposable income (SP-F) (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
6.3 The tax-transfer effect
Disposable income can be either higher or lower than market income, depending
on whether the household is a net beneficiary or a net financer of the tax-transfer
system. Single parent households appear to be net beneficiaries in all countries,
as seen from table 6. Going from market income to disposable income increases
their income by on average 14%, ranging from 4% in Luxembourg, to 25% in
Poland. Disaggregating the results by gender reveals that the positive effect is
almost entirely driven by single mothers. Single fathers are net beneficiaries only
in Spain and Poland, where their income increases by 14 and 27% respectively.
As for two parent households they appear to be net financers in most coun-
tries, and get their income reduced by on average 6% when moving from market
income to disposable income. Only in Spain, Hungary, Italy and Poland does
their income increase, and most notably so in Hungary. The gender differences
appear modest in all countries when considering two-parent households, which
is as could be expected.
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Table 6: Change in income caused by tax-transfer system
Country SP-M SP-F SP TP-M TP-F TP
Luxembourg -21 8 4 -9 -6 -8
Finland -11 11 5 -20 -17 -20
Austria -18 17 9 -14 -14 -14
Hungary -9 20 11 24 27 24
Italy -14 14 11 4 6 5
Sweden -4 18 13 -17 -11 -16
Switzerland -8 22 15 -21 -19 -21
Spain 14 17 17 8 8 8
United Kingdom -11 25 20 -18 -17 -18
Norway -9 37 21 -15 -13 -15
Poland 27 25 25 6 6 6
Average -6 19 14 -7 -5 -6
Change in income when going from market income to disposable income (%),
for male single parent households (SP-M), female single parent households (SP-
F), single parent houesholds (SP), male headed two parent houesholds (TP-M),
female headed two parent households (TP-F) and two parent households (TP),
year 2004. Data: LIS.
While all single parent households achieve increased incomes through the
tax-transfer system, this does not necessarily imply that their relative income
must rise. As illustrated in figure 8, the relative outcomes of single parents do
however improve for nearly all countries when taxes and transfers are accounted
for. The exception is Hungary, in which single parent households actually see
their relative income reduced by the public welfare system. The reason for this is
found in table 6, in which it is made clear that Hungarian two parent households
benefit more from the tax-transfer system than single parent households.
The largest redistributive effects are found in the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land and Norway, where relative single parent income increases by more than
40% when taxes and transfers are accounted for. Increases exceeding 30% are
found in Finland and Sweden, with the increase for Austria just falling short
of 30%. More modest increases are found in Luxembourg and Poland (10-20%)
and Italy and Spain (less than 10%). It thus seems like the Scandinavian and
the Anglo-Saxon countries are most successful in raising single parent relative
income through the tax-transfer system.
Comparing the results from figure 8 to the relative market incomes of single
parents, a clear pattern emerges. The countries that increase relative outcomes
the most through the tax-transfer system are the countries in which relative
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single parent outcomes were initially the lowest. The large amounts of redis-
tribution in Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom must thus be seen
in connection with the low market outcomes in these countries. Similarly, the
two countries with the lowest degree of redistribution, Hungary and Italy, are
also the countries in which relative single parent outcomes were originally the
highest.
Figure 9 plots relative single parent market income against the degree of
redistribution, thereby capturing the strong negative relationship. As a result
of this trend there is less dispersion in relative disposable incomes then in market
incomes across countries.
Figure 8: Cash redistribution
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Change in relative single parent income when going from market income to
disposable income (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
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Figure 9: Cash redistribution and initial outcomes
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Relative single parent market income (%) and the increase in relative single
parent income when going from market income to disposable income (%), year
2004. Data: LIS.
Decomposing the re-distributional effect by gender yields the results pre-
sented in figure 10. Both male and female single parents increase their relative
income due to the tax-transfer system in Spain, Poland, Finland, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. In Italy, Luxembourg and Austria,
only female single parents benefit, while both genders are made relatively worse
off in Hungary. Only in Poland however, do single fathers benefit more (or loose
less) than single mothers.
While the United Kingdom achieved the largest redistribution when con-
sidering all single parents, the country moves down two places in the relative
ranking when only single mothers are considered. Norway on the other hand,
moves up two places, thereby achieving the highest degree of redistribution for
female single parents with a 61% increase in their relative income. Other coun-
tries that get their relative ranking affected include Luxembourg and Italy, who
move up one place, and Poland and Spain, who move down one place.
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Figure 10: Cash redistribution by gender
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Change in relative single parent income when going from market income to
disposable income, by gender (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
Transfers
A complete decomposition of the redistribution achieved when moving from
market income to disposable income is not possible with the information at
hand. However, as data exists on social transfers, transfer income and income
taxes, most of the difference is captured. Note that the re-distributional effect
found when considering market income and disposable income need not perfectly
match the redistribution found when considering market income, income taxes
and transfer. This is due to the components left out, such as capital taxes and
wealth taxes. Because several of the sample countries do not provide data on
male headed single parent households and/or female headed two-parent house-
holds when taxes and transfers are considered separately, only female headed
single parent households and male headed two-parent households will be con-
sidered in the rest of this section.
Figure 11 illustrates the social transfer income received by the two household
types. Single mothers receive more in social transfers than two-parent house-
holds in all sample countries, with the difference appearing especially large in
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The average single parent transfer in-
come equals Int$ 5,496, with the equivalent two-parent figure being 3,642.
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Private transfer income is found by subtracting social transfers from the
total transfer income. The results are presented in figure 12. As can be seen,
private transfers are lower in magnitude than social transfers, and appear quite
limited in a number of countries. The figures for Norway are especially low,
as single parent households receive only Int$ 12 in private transfers. Private
transfer income is positive in all countries, with the exception of Spanish two-
parent households. All though single parents appear to benefit from private
transfers in a number of countries, Switzerland stands out as the only country
where private transfers and social transfer are comparable in size. Swiss single
mothers receive more than Int$ 5,000 in private transfers, which is more than
double the amount of any other sample country. Although LIS achieves a high
degree of consistency in its datasets, this could in theory be the result of some
difference in statistical procedure.
Figure 11: Social transfer income








	





Social transfer income for female single parent households (SP-F) and male
two-parent households (TP-M) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS.
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Figure 12: Private transfer income
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Private transfer income for female single parent households (SP-F) and male
two-parent households (TP-M) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS.
As the transfer income of single parents exceed that of other parents in all
countries, including transfers in the analysis should raise relative single parent
outcomes. This is confirmed in figure 13, which illustrates the change in relative
single parent income when transfers are added to market income. The largest
effects are found in Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, where relative
incomes increase with 44, 53, and 67% respectively. Increases around 30% are
found in Poland, Sweden and Finland, while increases ranging from 20-30% are
found in Luxembourg and Austria. More modest effects are found in Hungary,
Italy and Spain. Transfers are thus found to benefit single parents relative to
other parents in all sample countries, and especially so in the Scandinavian and
Anglo-Saxon countries.
Looking at the figures for social and private transfers separately, it seems
clear that the two vary in importance across countries. Figure 14 decomposes the
increase in relative income by transfer source, with social transfers dominating
private transfers in all countries except Switzerland. Social transfers increase
relative outcomes the most in Norway and the United Kingdom, followed by
Sweden and Finland. Private transfers on the other hand, have the largest
effect in Switzerland, followed by Poland and Austria. Both social and private
transfers are thus found to improve single parent relative outcomes across the
sample.
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Figure 13: Transfer redistribution
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Increase in relative single parent income (SP-F/TP-M) due to transfer income
(%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
Figure 14: Transfer redistribution by transfer source
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Increase in relative single parent income (SP-F/TP-M) due to social transfer
income and private transfer income (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
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Taxes
Figure 15 presents income taxes by household type. Because of missing data
Hungary and Italy are left out of the tax analysis. As sees from the figure,
single parents pay less in income tax than a two-parent household, although the
magnitude of the difference varies across the sample. In Spain both household
types are found to pay a negative income tax, with the benefit directed at two
parent households actually exceeding that of single parent households.
As single parent families have relatively low market incomes it comes as no
surprise that they pay less in income taxes. Expressing tax payments relative
to market income yields the figures illustrated in figure 16. Single parent house-
holds face tax burdens below two-parent households in most countries, but the
differences appear modest compared to the gains resulting from transfer income.
In Poland and Switzerland single parents actually face higher tax burdens than
other parents.
Figure 15: Income taxes by household type
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Income taxes for female headed single parent households (SP-F) and male
headed two parent households (TP-M) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS.
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Figure 16: Tax burdens by household type
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Income taxes for female headed single parent households (SP-F) and male
headed two parent households (TP-M), relative to market income (Int$), year
2004. Data: LIS
While transfer income was found to increase the relative income of single
parents by on average 32%, more modest increases are found when considering
taxes. Figure 17 illustrates the change in single parent relative income when
income taxes are subtracted from market income, leading to an average increase
of 1.8%. The effect is found to be negative in three countries, with the largest
positive effects found in Norway and the United Kingdom. Considering only
the six countries with a positive tax effect the average impact is found to equal
4.2%.
The United Kingdom and Norway appear to have relatively large re-distributional
effects both when taxes and transfers are being considered. Switzerland on the
other hand, achieves a large re-distributional effect through transfers, but is
found to implement a negative re-distributional effect through the tax system.
Accordingly, there does not appear to be any clear connection between the
degree of transfer redistribution and the degree of tax redistribution within
countries.
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Figure 17: Tax redistribution
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Increase in the relative income of female headed single parent households due
to income taxes (%), year 2004. Data: LIS.
6.4 Summing up
To sum up, single parents have market incomes of on average 59% of other par-
ents. The figures range from less than 40% in the United Kingdom, to more
than 80% in Hungary. When considering disposable income single parents per-
form better, suggesting that the tax-transfer system works to their benefit. On
average, single parent disposable income equals 72% of other parent’s income,
ranging from just above 50% in the United Kingdom, to 80% in Austria. The
difference in outcomes between single mothers and single fathers is also sub-
stantially reduced when taxes and transfers are accounted for.
In going from market income to disposable income the relative income of
single parents increase with about 20%. Only in Hungary is the effect found to
be negative, while modest positive effects of less than 10% are found for Italy
and Spain. The largest effects are seen for the United Kingdom, Switzerland
and Norway, in which case the increase exceeds 40%. It appears that the re-
distributional effect is largest in countries where initial single parent outcomes
are low. Accordingly, there is less variation in relative disposable incomes across
countries, then in relative market incomes. With respect to the different types
of welfare regimes, the highest degrees of cash redistribution is seen in the
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Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries. More dispersed levels are found for
the Bismarckian countries, with especially Switzerland achieving levels in the
top range.
Decomposing the re-distributional effect into transfers and taxes reveals that
transfers are more important in improving the outcomes of single parents. While
transfers increase relative single parent income in all countries, income taxes
are found to have a negative re-distributional effect in Poland, Switzerland and
Spain. The sample countries also differ in the relative magnitudes of private
and social transfers, with private transfers being less important in all countries
but Switzerland.
7 Extended income calculations
In kind income in the form of education and health care benefits will be included
in the extended income measure. This has the benefit of capturing a larger
share of the redistribution achieved by the public sector. Education benefits are
assumed to equally benefit all children in the relevant age group, while health
care benefits are assumed to vary with age and gender. The difference in the
in kind income received by single parent households and two parent households
will thus be driven by differences in household size and composition only. In
other words, after adjusting for the number of children and adults living in
a household, the in kind benefits received by the two household types will be
the same. This method thus ignores other sources as to why education and
health care benefits may vary across households, such as the health status of
the household members, the utilization rate of private education services etc.
Including in kind benefits will still have re-distributional effects after household
composition is controlled for, as initial single parent income is low compared to
other parents.
7.1 Education income
Assigning education transfers to single parent households
Data on education expenditures are retrieved from the Euro stat database and
are defined to include both primary and secondary education. The relevant
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age group for benefiting from education expenditures is thus assumed to be 6-
16. Some sample countries have mandatory education until the age of 18, in
which case the two last years of compulsory education will be excluded from the
analysis.
It will be assumed that all people aged 6-16 benefit equally from public
education expenditures. The assumption is thus a take up rate of 100% and a
uniform utility distribution. As pointed out by Aaberge et al (2010b) private
schools may prove a concern if the magnitude of these services is sufficiently
large. However, as private schools play a limited role in most European countries
this should not be too problematic (Aaberge et al 2010b, p.333).
To allocate education expenditures data on the age distribution of children
and the average number of children in single parent households are needed.
These data are taken from the Euro stat SILC database and the OECD Family
database respectively. While children include all persons below the age of 18,
only those aged 6-16 are assumed to receive education benefits. By utilizing
population data by birth year the share of children in the relevant age group
can be calculated according to formula (6), where NCij stands for the average
number of children in each age group (i) for a given country (j).
Share6− 16j =
∑16
i=6NCij∑17
i=0NCij
(6)
The average number of children in two parent families exceeds the average
number of children in single parent families in all sample countries except Swe-
den. As can be seen from Table 7 the average number of children ranges from
less than 1.5 in Finland and Austria, to more than 1.7 in Spain and Sweden.
Multiplying the average number of children with the share aged 6-16 yields the
expected number of students (NS) in the average single parent household, as
illustrated in formula (7). Column three of Table 7 presents the average number
of children in the relevant age group for all sample countries.
E (NSj) = Share6− 16j ∗NCj (7)
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Table 7: Children in single parent households
Country NC Share6-16 NS
Finland 1.47 0.62 0.92
Austria 1.49 0.64 0.95
Norway 1.50 0.62 0.93
Italy 1.51 0.61 0.92
Hungary 1.57 0.63 0.99
United Kingdom 1.60 0.67 1.08
Switzerland 1.61 0.63 1.01
Poland 1.61 0.64 1.03
Luxembourg 1.70 0.62 1.06
Spain 1.76 0.59 1.04
Sweden 1.83 0.62 1.13
Number of children in the average single parent household (NC), share aged
6-16, and number of children aged 6-16 (NS), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
The education transfer to the average single parent household (EducHH) is
found by multiplying the per student expenditure level (Educ) with the expected
number of students in the household, in accordance with formula (8). Because
household size differs across countries equivalence scales are needed to correct
for economics of scale. To achieve consistency the same equivalence scale as
used for cash income is utilized also for in kind income. This implies dividing
the household education transfer by the square root of the number of household
members in accordance with formula (9).
EducHHj = E(NSj) ∗ Educj (8)
AdjEducHHj =
EducHHj√
HHmj
(9)
Table 8 presents the education transfer accruing to the average single parent
household, both before and after correcting for household size. For illustrational
purposes the adjusted education transfers are further presented in Figure 18.
As could be expected, there are large cross country differences in the amount of
education support achieved by the average single parent household. At the low
end of the distribution one finds Poland and Hungary, with education transfers
around Int$ 3,000. In Spain, Italy and Finland transfers range from 4,000 to
6,000, while being roughly equal to 6,000 in the United Kingdom and Austria.
Education transfers lie between 7,000 an 8,000 in Switzerland, Norway and
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Sweden, and reach a record high of almost 12,000 in Luxembourg.
Table 8: Education transfers
Country Educ EducHH ES =
√
HHm AdjEducHH
Poland 4,039 4,155 1.62 2,572
Hungary 5,093 5,030 1.60 3,136
Spain 6,907 7,180 1.66 4,324
Italy 9,045 8,354 1.58 5,271
Finland 9,629 8,824 1.57 5,615
United Kingdom 9,127 9,831 1.61 6,098
Austria 10,266 9,706 1.58 6,153
Switzerland 11,573 11,745 1.61 7,275
Norway 13,401 12,497 1.58 7,905
Sweden 11,833 13,351 1.68 7,936
Luxembourg 18,428 19,451 1.64 11,844
Education transfers (Int$), equivalent scales and adjusted education transfers
for the average single parent household (Int$), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
Figure 18: Education transfers
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Adjusted education transfers (Int$), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
Calculating relative single parent education income
The same procedure as outlined above is used to find the education income of two
parent households. The income figures of both household types are presented
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in Table 9, and show that single parent households receive higher benefits from
education services than other families in seven of the sample countries. The
only reason why the education transfers differ between the household types is
household size and composition. The countries in which single parent families
receive relatively large education transfers are the countries in which single
parent families also have relatively many children. Sweden is for example the
only country in the sample where single parent families have more children than
two parent families, and is also clearly the country in which relative single parent
education income is the highest. On the other end of the scale one finds Norway,
Finland and Austria, where single parent families have relatively few children,
and single parent families accordingly receive less in education transfers relative
to other families.
Table 9: Education transfers by household type
Country TP SP SP/TP
Norway 8178 7905 97
Finland 5738 5615 98
Austria 6205 6153 99
Poland 2576 2572 100
Switzerland 7128 7275 102
Hungary 2999 3136 105
Luxembourg 11292 11844 105
Italy 5019 5271 105
United Kingdom 5790 6098 105
Spain 3957 4324 109
Sweden 5757 7936 138
Education transfers for two parent households (TP) and single parent house-
holds (SP) (Int$) and single parent education transfers relative to two parent
education transfers (SP/TP) (%), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
7.2 Health care income
Assigning health care transfers to single parent households
Data on health care expenditures per capita are derived from the OECD Health
database. Only government expenditures are included, thereby excluding pri-
vate sector expenditures and household out-of-pocket payments.
While it was assumed that all people in the target group received the same
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benefit from education services, this is not the case when dealing with health
care. Health care transfers will instead be allocated based on the so called
insurance principle. In a private insurance market people will pay different pre-
miums on their health insurance based on certain demographic characteristics,
such as age and sex. To capture the differences in health care needs, the aver-
age households will thus be assigned health care income in accordance with its
demographic profile.
The European Commission (2012) provides data on health care usage by age
and sex. These figures are used to construct so called health care multipliers,
which indicate the relative health care needs of different age-sex groups. The
health care multipliers are derived according to formula (10). Hig stands for
expected health care usage given age (i) and sex (g). The utilization rates are
expressed as a share of GDP per capita (Y¯ ). Dividing group specific health care
needs as a share of GDP by total health care needs as a share of GDP, yields
relative group specific needs. The multipliers are illustrated in Figure 19 and
listed in the appendix. As can be seen, health care usage falls in the first years
of life, and starts increasing in the 50’s. Women have higher multipliers than
men in childbearing years, but this trend is reversed before the age of 60.
Multig =
Hig
Y∑100
i=1
Hig
Y
(10)
To allocate health care expenditures across households some assumptions
must be made. First, it is assumed that the utilization rates by age and sex are
the same across the sample. Data indicates that there are substantial differences
in the health care usage of elderly people across countries, but less so for younger
age groups. As this paper looks only at children and adults with children below
the age of 18 this should not be a source of great concern.
A second assumption is made regarding the age structure of households. It is
assumed that the age distribution of both children and parents are the same for
single parent households and two parent households within each country. This is
likely to be an oversimplification as there may very well be significant differences
in the age of especially single parents and non-single parents. However, such
age differences can be expected to be minor in magnitude, and since health care
multipliers for adults do not change between the age of 26 and 43, this should
not bias the results noteworthy.
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Figure 19: Health care multipliers
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Health care multipliers for women and men by age. Data: European Comission
(2012).
After estimating the multipliers, health expenditures are allocated to the
respective household members. The health care transfer accruing to children in
the average single parent household is found in accordance with formula (11),
by multiplying the average country health care transfer (HT ) with the average
number of children (NC) and the appropriate health multiplier (Mult), given
the expected age of the child. The latter is found by utilizing population data
from the SILC database. As there are no differences in health care needs between
the sexes for children, only the age of the child (i) is accounted for.
HTchildrenj = HTj ∗Multij ∗NCj (11)
For adults it is necessary to control both for the age and gender of the single
parent. This is done by combining data on the mean age of first time mothers
with the expected child age to arrive at the expected age of the mother. First
time fathers are found to be 10% older than first time mothers, and it is assumed
that this age gap is the same for all sample countries3. The OECD Family
database provides data on the prevalence of single mothers and single fathers
in all sample countries, thus making it possible to calculate the expected adult
health transfer according to formula (12), where FSP stands for the share of
female single parents, and MSP stands for the share of male single parents.
3This is not based on country specific data, but on estiamtes from Norway and the Nether-
lands only.
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E(HTadultj) = (HTj ∗ FSPj ∗Multigj) + (HT j ∗MSPj ∗Multigj) (12)
HTHHj = HTchildrenj + HTadultj (13)
The total household health care income is then given as the sum of the child
and adult transfer, as expressed in formula (13). As can be seen from Table 10,
child transfers are larger in magnitude than adult transfers in all countries. As
children in the relevant age group do not have health multipliers higher than
their parents this is a result of the mechanical fact that there are more children
than adults in the average single parent household.
Table 10: Health care transfers by household member
Country HTchildren HTadult HTHH
Poland 335 269 604
Hungary 547 449 996
Spain 990 716 1,706
Italy 1,023 863 1,886
Finland 1,015 886 1,901
United Kingdom 1,239 999 2,237
Switzerland 1,387 1,108 2,495
Austria 1,430 1,234 2,665
Sweden 1,652 1,156 2,808
Norway 1,919 1,630 3,548
Luxembourg 2,226 1,651 3,877
Average health care transfers to single parent households by receiving household
member (Int$), year 2004. Data. OECD, SILC.
As with education transfers, health care income needs to be adjusted for
household size. This is again done by dividing the health care transfer with
the square root of the number of household members in accordance with for-
mula (14). The results are presented in Table 11, and the adjusted health care
transfers are further illustrated in figure 20.
AdjHTHHj =
HTHHj√
HHmj
(14)
Health care transfers accruing to the average single parent family are smaller
in magnitude than in kind education income. This is mainly a result of the
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demographic structure of single parent households. As single parent families
have relatively many children per adult education income is an important source
of in kind income. Expected health care usage is on the other hand relatively
low because of the young age structure of these households.
Health care transfers per household are lowest in Poland and Hungary at
Int$ 374 and 621 respectively. The figures range from 1,000 to 1,500 in Spain,
Italy, Finland and the United Kingdom, while exceeding 1,500 in Switzerland,
Sweden and Austria. Norway and Luxembourg stand out as the two countries
with the highest health care transfers per household, with figures well above
Int$ 2,000.
Most countries receive the same relative country ranking when considering
health care transfers and education transfers. There are however some excep-
tions. Austria and Norway both receive a higher ranking when considering
health care transfers rather than education transfers, while the opposite is true
for Switzerland and Sweden. No country moves with more than two places
however, making the variations appear modest.
Table 11: Health care transfers
Country HT HTHH ES =
√
HHm AdjHTHH
Poland 553 604 1.62 374
Hungary 926 996 1.60 621
Spain 1,500 1,706 1.66 1,027
Italy 1,802 1,886 1.58 1,190
Finland 1,838 1,901 1.57 1,210
United Kingdom 2,062 2,237 1.61 1,388
Switzerland 2,298 2,495 1.61 1,546
Sweden 2,403 2,808 1.68 1,669
Austria 2,558 2,665 1.58 1,689
Norway 3,406 3,548 1.58 2,244
Luxembourg 3,491 3,877 1.64 2,361
Health care transfers to the average single parent household (Int$), equivalent
scale and adjusted health care transfer to the average single parent household
(Int$), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
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Figure 20: Health care transfers
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Adjusted health care transfers to the average single parent household (Int$),
year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
Calculating relative single parent health care income
Health care income for two parent families is found by using the method outlined
above. The only difference regards the calculation of the adult health care
transfer, in which it is assumed that each two-parent family consists of one male
and one female parent. Table 12 presents health care incomes by household
type and the relative transfer received by single parent families. As seen in
column three, single parent families receive between 81 and 91% of the health
care transfer received by other families. This is partly due to single parent
households on average having fewer members than other households, although
this is in part controlled for through the use of equivalence scales. Another
reason is that single parent households have a high number of children per adult,
and these children have lower health care multipliers than their parents. As was
the case with education transfers, single parent families receive larger relative
health care transfers in countries where they on average have more household
members.
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Table 12: Health care transfer by household type
Country TP-HH SP-HH SP-HH/TP-HH
Norway 2,758 2,244 81
Finland 1,478 1,210 82
Austria 2,054 1,689 82
Poland 450 374 83
Switzerland 1,857 1,546 83
Italy 1,429 1,190 83
Luxembourg 2,830 2,361 83
Hungary 741 621 84
United Kingdom 1,651 1,388 84
Spain 1,210 1,027 85
Sweden 1,843 1,669 91
Health care income for two parent households (TP) and single parent households
(SP) (Int$) and relative single parent health care income (SP/TP) (%), year
2004. Data: OECD, SILC.
7.3 Total income
Adding in kind transfers to disposable income mechanically raises the total
income of single parent households. The sum of in cash and in kind income can
be thought of as an extended income measure, in which the two most important
publicly provided private goods are included. Table 13 presents the income
of the average single parent family in each sample country, both in cash and
in kind. While cash income exceeds in kind transfer income in all countries,
education and health care transfers increase household income by on average
48%, thereby making up a substantial part of the extended income measure.
Adding in kind income does not significantly alter the relative country ranking,
as only Austria and Switzerland are affected. Switzerland moves up from fourth
to third place when in kind income is included, while Austria moves down from
third to fourth place.
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Table 13: Single parent income
Country In cash In kind Total
Poland 6,435 2,945 9,380
Hungary 7,822 3,757 11,579
Spain 12,817 5,351 18,168
Italy 13,633 6,461 20,094
United Kingdom 14,892 7,486 22,377
Finland 15,927 6,825 22,751
Sweden 16,161 9,605 25,766
Austria 19,645 7,843 27,488
Switzerland 19,498 8,821 28,318
Norway 20,546 10,150 30,695
Luxembourg 27,038 14,205 41,242
Single parent household income in cash, in kind and total (Int$), year 2004.
Data: LIS, OECD, SILC.
Figure 21 provides a closer look at the different income concepts. As seen
from the graph, education transfers dominate health care transfers in all sample
countries. While education transfers on average raise total income by 39%,
the equivalent figure for health care transfers is 9%. In other words, education
transfers stand for more than 80% of the income increase caused by adding in
kind income to the analysis.
Figure 21: Total income by income source
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Single parent household disposable income (DPI-SP), education income (EDUC-
SP) and health care income (HT-SP) (Int$), year 2004. Data: LIS, OECD,
SILC.
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Figure 22: Relative disposable and total income
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Single parent household disposable income (DPI) and total income (TOT) rel-
ative to two parent households (%), year 2004. Data: LIS, OECD, SILC.
Single parent families receive about the same in education and health care
benefits as other families, once household size and composition is accounted for.
As single parent disposable income is lower that the income of other families, in-
cluding these publicly provided services should have a positive re-distributional
effect. This is confirmed in figure 22, which illustrates the relative disposable
income and the relative total income of single parent families. Relative income
rises across the sample when education and health care transfers are included
in the extended income measure.
Table 14 lists relative single parent household income for disposable and
total income. Column three shows the percentage increase in relative income
when going from cash income to the extended income measure. Adding ed-
ucation and health care income increases the relative income of single parent
households by on average 10%, with the effect ranging from 5% in Austria to
21% in Sweden. Note however that this redistributive effect is due to both the
generosity of public transfers and household structure4. There again appears
to be a negative correlation between initial cash outcomes and the degree of
increase in the relative income figures. That is, in countries where the relative
disposable income of single parent households is low, adding in kind income
4 Efforts to isolate the generosity effect is undertaken in section 8.
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has a larger positive effect on their relative outcomes. This is caused by the
redistributive effect that comes about when assigning the same transfer value
to households with different initial incomes.
Table 14: In kind redistribution
Country rel. DPI rel. TOT Increase in rel. income
Austria 80 84 5
Poland 79 84 6
Switzerland 77 83 7
Italy 79 85 7
Hungary 76 83 8
Finland 68 74 9
Norway 68 74 10
Luxembourg 73 81 10
Spain 69 77 11
United Kingdom 54 64 18
Sweden 68 82 21
Single parent household income relative to two parent household income (%),
year 2004. Data: LIS, OECD, SILC.
8 Discussion
8.1 Summary of results
Single parent households obtain a market income that on average equals roughly
60% of a two-parent income. This relative performance increases to 72% after
taxes and transfers are included, implying an increase in relative single parent
income of 20%. Adding education and health care benefits further increases
their equalized relative income to 79%, indicating a 10% increase in relative
outcomes. The performance of single parent households thus increases with a
total of just above 30% once in cash and in kind redistribution is accounted for.
While taxes and transfers account for the majority of the redistribution, public
services still make up around 1/3 of the re-distributional impact. Including
more public services in the analysis should increase the relative importance of
in kind transfers further.
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Figure 23: Summary of results
8.2 Redistribution in the different welfare regimes
Total redistribution is found to be high in the social democratic countries at
above 50%. That is, through taxes, transfers and public service provision, the
income of single parents relative to other parents is increased by 54%. The effect
is highest in Sweden at just above 60%, followed by Norway at 56% and Finland
at 43%. The three countries thus obtain relatively similar levels of redistribution,
confirming the appropriateness of grouping the Nordic countries together as
one welfare regime type. The high level of redistribution found in the social
democratic countries is as predicted. That is, in accordance with the hypothesis
it seems as though single parents are important beneficiaries of universal welfare
regimes, even though these do not specifically target low income households.
This result is in line with the findings of Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Brady
and Burroway (2012), Mitchell et al. (1994) and Korpi and Palme (1998).
Decomposing redistribution by transfer source yields similar results. Cash
redistribution in the Nordic countries is found to be high at around 37%, al-
though Switzerland and the United Kingdom both achieve even higher rates of
redistribution. Looking at gender specific redistribution rates however, Norway
surpasses Switzerland and the United Kingdom, thereby achieving the highest
redistribution rate towards single mothers at just above 60%. The redistribu-
tion directed at single fathers appears modest in comparison, but also here the
Scandinavian countries perform relatively well.
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Figure 24: Total redistribution and welfare regime
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1: Anglo-Saxon, 2: Scandinavian, 3: Bismarckian, 4: Southern, 5: Post-
Communist.
As previously mentioned, the redistributive effect of in kind income is the
result of two factors – the generosity of social services and differences in house-
hold structure. In order to isolate the generosity effect one can assume that the
difference between single parent and two parent household structure is the same
for all countries, so that NCj = NC, NSj = NS, MultChildj = MultChild,
MultFemalej = MultFemale, MultMalej = MultMale for both household
types, and SPFj = SPF , SPMj = SPM . Any difference in the redistributive
effect across countries will now be due to differences in the magnitude of in kind
income relative to disposable income only. It can be argued that the redistribu-
tive impact found when holding household structure fixed is more relevant for
the hypothesis, as it better reflects the direct generosity of the welfare state. In
particular, it ensures that the countries in which single parent families have rel-
atively many children are not deemed as having more generous transfer schemes
than they in fact have.
The redistribution achieved in kind when holding household structure fixed
is illustrated in figure 25, and is plotted against type of welfare regime in figure
26. As seen from the graph, the Scandinavian countries achieve high levels of
redistribution also when in kind transfers are considered, with an average effect
of 13%.
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Figure 25: In kind redistribution with fixed household structure
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Increase in relative single parent income caused by in kind transfers, when house-
hold structure is held fixed (%), year 2004. Data: OECD, SILC, LIS.
The United Kingdom is the only Anglo-Saxon or liberal country in the sam-
ple, thereby making it somewhat difficult to draw any definite conclusions on
the outcomes of this group. However, the country appears to achieve remark-
ably high levels of redistribution, and even exceed the rates observed in the
Scandinavian countries in many cases. Although this may be the result of a
number of different factors, two potential causes are mentioned here. First, sin-
gle parent employment is extremely low in the United Kingdom, compared to
the sample average. With every one in two British single parents being unem-
ployed, it seems almost unavoidable that this will lead to transfer income being
high relative to market income – thus explaining the high levels of redistribution
observed.
A second possible explanation is found by looking at the British welfare
system over time. While the United Kingdom today is usually grouped together
with liberal countries such as the United States and Australia, the pre-Thatcher
period was characterized by a larger degree of universal welfare programs. Levy
(1999, p. 241) argues that Britain may in fact have more in common with the
Scandinavian countries than the Bismarckian countries with respect to universal
welfare benefits, and that this is largely a result of pre-Thatcher traditions. It
can therefore be argued that the high level of redistribution found in the United
Kingdom is in line with the theory that single parents have much to gain from
universal welfare programs.
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Figure 26: In kind redistribution and welfare regime
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1: Anglo-Saxon, 2: Scandinavian, 3: Bismarckian, 4: Southern, 5: Post-
Communist.
The remaining welfare regimes achieve intermediate to modest levels of re-
distribution. Looking first at total redistribution the Bismarckian countries
seem to outperform the Southern and the Post-communist countries, but all
three groups obtain similar levels of redistribution when only in kind income is
considered.
Regarding the social outcomes observed in the different welfare regimes,
there seems to be a high degree of consistency within the different groups. The
Social democratic countries are found to achieve similar social outcomes, as
are the Southern countries. There is somewhat more variation seen in the total
levels of redistribution in the Bismarckian countries, but less so when considering
in kind income. The only group that does not appear to reach comparable
social outcomes is the Post-communist regime type. While Hungary is found to
actually decrease the relative income of single parent households through the
public welfare system, Poland achieves an increase in relative income of around
25%. The two countries do however reach similar outcomes when considering
in kind redistribution only.
All in all the welfare regime typology seems successful in its ability to predict
the re-distributional outcomes obtained in the different countries, and confirms
the hypothesis that universal welfare programs represent substantial benefits
also for weaker groups.
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8.3 Robustness
Assumptions
To complete the analysis with the data at hand some assumptions have been
made. These vary from plausible theories to obviously inaccurate simplifica-
tions. First, some income figures are estimated because of missing data. This
is the case for single father income in Switzerland, Hungary and Italy, and fe-
male headed two parent households in Hungary and Norway. In both cases the
average gender wage gap is calculated based on the countries with complete
data sets. The missing income figures are then found by using the income of
the non-missing gender combined with the average wage gender gap. As the
difference in wages between the sexes varies across the sample, this is obviously
suboptimal.
Second, it is assumed that the difference between market income and dis-
posable income reflects the cash redistribution taking place through a country’s
tax-transfer system. As also private transfers affect disposable income, the re-
distribution taking place is not in whole controlled by the government.
Most of the assumptions are however connected to the calculation of the in
kind income levels. It is assumed that all children in the relevant age group
benefit equally from education. This ignores the use of private school services,
as well as potential drop-outs. It also does not account for the more hard-to-
measure concept of learning potential, which might depend on the education
level of the parents, the personal characteristics of the child etc. A further as-
sumption is made that school attendance is mandatory for ages 6-16. This is
somewhat inaccurate as the duration of mandatory education varies between
countries. All sample countries except Luxembourg and the United Kingdom
start their mandatory schooling at age 6 or 7. Children in Luxembourg start
compulsory schooling at age 4, but this is registered as pre-primary education,
and thereby not included in they analysis. Primary school starts at age 6 in
Luxembourg, and is therefore in line with the rest of the sample. As table 15
illustrates there is more variation in school leaving age, which might also bias
the results. Austrian students are free to end their education at age 14, while
Hungarian and Polish students must attend until age 18. Most of the sam-
ple countries complete their mandatory education at age 16. A more accurate
estimation technique could improve the preciseness of these results.
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Table 15: School age
Country Entry age Exit age
Austria 6 14
Finland 7 16
Hungary 6 18
Italy 6 15
Luxembourg 4 15
Norway 6 16
Poland 6 18
Spain 6 16
Sweden 7 16
Switzerland 7 15
United Kingdom 5 16
Compulsory school entry and exit age. Source: Educate Abroad.
When considering health care services, differences in need caused by age
and sex are accounted for. Other reasons why health care needs may differ
are however not included in the analysis. Potential reasons include differences
in income, area of residence, personal preferences etc. When considering single
parent households two concerns in particular come to mind. First, as the average
single parent household has a relatively low income, this may be linked to lower
expected health status. If so, their benefit from health care income is being
underestimated. Second, as single parent families may have less access to private
health care services due to their lower income, their reliance on public provision
may be higher. This may lead them to value health care services more than other
families, as they have less access to substitutes through the private market. It is
further assumed that the health care multipliers are the same for all countries,
implying that the need of a 20 year old female relative to a 70 year old male is
the same for all countries. As previously noted there is little variation in relative
needs for those below 50, suggesting that this should not be an important issue
in practice.
In the allocation of in kind income some assumptions must be made regarding
the age structure of the household members. The expected age of the child is
found by calculating the share of children in each age group. To find the expected
age of the mother the average age of the child is added to the expected age of
first time mothers. This is done with country specific data. To arrive at the
expected age of the father however, it is assumed that fathers are 10% older than
mothers, a figure which is based on data from Norway and the Netherlands only.
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It is further assumed that the age structure is identical for single parent and two
parent families. While this is almost certainly not the case, the simplification is
probably without significant importance. Expected parental age is only relevant
when calculating health care needs, and as the health multipliers hardly change
within the relevant age interval this should not affect the results noteworthy.
Finally, it is assumed that two parent families consist of one male and one female
parent, which is probably not very far from the truth. Even if this does not
hold, the difference in health care needs between men and women is relatively
modest.
Analysis
As discussed in section 5.3 the choice of equivalence scale can affect the results.
This paper uses the square root scale, which takes into account the number of
household members, but not the age composition. The chosen equivalent scale
assigns a weight of 0.5 to each (additional) household member, thereby implying
relatively large economics of scale. While it is well documented that the choice
of equivalence scale can affect the results, this should be less of a problem when
comparing one household type across countries (Burniaux et al. 1998, p.83).
The importance of adjusting for differences in needs is highlighted in Aaberge
et al. (2010a,b). The authors show that not adjusting for needs may lead to
an overestimation of the benefit of in kind income for high-need groups, such as
single parent households. No such adjustment is done in this paper. However,
as the paper does not seek to compare different household groups, but rather
compare the economic outcomes of single parent households across countries,
this should be acceptable. Even though single parent income is expressed rel-
ative to two parent income, no attempt is made to compare the welfare of the
two household types. Rather, the income of other families is used to arrive
at a relative single parent income measure, thereby allowing for a meaningful
comparison across countries.
Another issue raised by Aaberge et al. (2010a) is the comparability of public
spending across geographical areas. It is not given that Int$ 200 worth of ed-
ucation in Hungary is the same as Int$ 200 worth of education in Switzerland,
although the figures are PPP-adjusted. This could be caused by a multiple of
factors, for example economics of scale, country specific institutions or the qual-
ity of teachers. No attempt is made to correct for this. Aaberge et al. (2010a)
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find significant variation in unit costs for Norwegian municipalities, especially
in primary education, health care and administration. The authors further find
that unit costs decrease with population size, and adopt a functional form which
allows the variation in costs to approach zero as the population grows sufficiently
large. It is therefore somewhat comforting that this paper deals with popula-
tions of several million people, but is still seems plausible that costs vary across
the sample.
In valuating in kind income it is assumed that the benefit received by the
household equals the public expenditure. As discussed in section 5.1, this need
not be true. However, as this paper sets out to compare the economic outcomes
of single parents across countries it is not crucial to the analysis that in kind
income is valuated exactly right. If all single parent households valuate educa-
tion income at, lets say, 80% of the expenditure level, this should have only a
modest effect on the analysis. If however, Spanish single parents value education
benefits at 120% while Swedish single parents value them at 40%, the results
might be misleading.
An obvious limit to the analysis is that only two publicly provided private
goods are included. Other relevant services include child care in particular,
and also dental care, social housing etc. The benefit to considering education
and health care is the large degree of consistency in their organization across
the sample. All sample countries provide public education services, and all
practice universal health care. Once other goods are considered there is more
variation across countries, thereby demanding a higher degree of complexity in
the analysis.
The static approach adopted in this paper might be viewed as a further
limitation. Single parent families may change into two parent families, plausi-
bly increasing not only total household income, but also income per household
member. Knowing that single parent households represent about 10% of all
households, a relatively large share of children will spend time in what is likely
to be a low income single parent household. The duration of such a low (relative)
income spell seems highly relevant.
Comparing the economic situation of households before and after public
sector involvement ignores any behavioral effects caused by there actual being
a public sector. It is conceptually impossible to measure the redistribution
obtained by the public sector, as the counterfactual of no taxes, transfers or
public services will never be observed. It seems plausible that the market income
in such a setting would differ from the market income obtained in the presence
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of a public sector. This highlights the difficulties of isolating the many effects at
hand. For example, if single parents work less than other parents this will lead
to a lower relative market income, and will probably also increase the degree of
cash redistribution. But the decision to work or not may be endogenous to the
degree of cash redistribution achieved or the type of welfare regime considered.
Data
The income data taken from LIS relies on national surveys. Table 16 presents
the number of households participating in the survey for each sample country.
A possible concern is the number of single parent households participating, as
this is expected to be low if the total number of participating households is
low. The only country in which there are less than 100 participating single
parent households is Hungary, in which only 57 such households are included.
On average, 592 single parent households are included in each national survey.
If there are less than 15 observations for any variable it is automatically left out
of the dataset. While LIS provides micro data this paper is based on average
income measures for the different household types. The use of micro data would
make it possible to control for employment status etc. for each household,
instead of handling aggregate figures for the two household groups.
To obtain the income measures for single parent households independent
of gender, gender distributions from the LIS database are utilized. However,
as the database does not provide this information for Sweden and Switzerland,
OECD-data is then utilized instead. As different databases may produce slightly
different figures, combining two different sources in such a way is not optimal.
It is also worth noting that the disaggregation of cash redistribution depends on
more estimated figures that the rest of the paper. The separate results on taxes
and transfers from section 6.3 are therefore not used in the discussion, which
instead focuses on cash redistribution as a whole.
54
Table 16: Number of households in survey
Country SP TP
Austria 238 1388
Finland 413 3278
Hungary 57 440
Italy 150 1785
Luxembourg 179 1111
Norway 654 4161
Poland 1329 11127
Spain 350 3810
Sweden 660 3804
Switzerland 124 947
United Kingdom 2363 6213
Number of single parent households (SP) and two parent households (TP) par-
ticipating in the national surveys used in LIS, year 2004. Data: LIS.
As for data on in kind income it is taken from the Euro stat database and the
OECD Health database for education expenditures and health care expenditures
respectively. This should ensure a higher level of consistency then if operating
with national statistics separately. Health care multipliers are taken from the
European Commission (2012), and are based on European countries only. The
countries in question do not perfectly match the sample countries, which could
in theory bias the results. However, the differences in multipliers are of modest
size, and should not be a source of great concern.
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9 Data appendix
Table 17: Health care multipliers
Age Health multipliers, female Health multipliers, male
0-2 0.63 0.63
3-4 0.50 0.50
5-24 0.38 0.38
25-43 0.50 0.44
44 0.50 0.50
45-48 0.63 0.56
49-52 0.63 0.63
53 0.75 0.69
54-57 0.75 0.75
58 0.75 0.81
59 0.88 0.88
60-62 0.88 0.94
63 0.88 1.00
64 1.00 1.06
65-66 1.00 1.13
67 1.13 1.19
68-69 1.13 1.25
70-71 1.25 1.38
72-73 1.38 1.50
74-75 1.38 1.57
76-77 1.50 1.63
78 1.50 1.69
79-81 1.63 1.75
Health care multipliers by age and gender. Data: European Commision (2012).
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